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ABSTRACT 
Ever since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, there has been a widely shared public perception in 
the UK and beyond that the British government lied in making the case for war. One 
major theme has been the view that the Blair government lied about the strength of the 
intelligence about alleged Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the extent of 
the WMD capabilities claimed by that intelligence. A second theme that has received less 
attention has been the view that the Blair government lied in claiming that its actions at 
the United Nations (UN) were aimed at securing peaceful Iraqi compliance with its 
disarmament obligations. Instead, most think that the UK was actually committed to a 
policy of regime change by force and did not want the ‘UN route’ to produce a peaceful 
outcome. The article argues that the conceptual focus of the discussion needs to be 
broadened from lying to also considering deception by omission and deception by 
distortion as part of a campaign of organized political persuasion. It argues that, on the 
WMD intelligence, it is now apparent that a campaign of deceptive organized political 
persuasion was conducted by UK officials. With respect to the UN route, there is 
mounting evidence that the Blair government ran a campaign of deception on this issue 
as well to pave Britain’s road to war in Iraq.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Ever since Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) or related programmes and production 
facilities were not found in Iraq after the invasion in 2003, there seems to have been a 
majority among the British public with the view that British Prime Minister Tony Blair, in 
concert with US President George W. Bush, jr, lied in various ways to pave the road to 
war.  An opinion poll in September 2003 indicated that 59% of those polled thought that 
Blair had lied (Reuters 2003). Although the deliberate misspelling of Blair’s name as 
‘Bliar’ predates his association with Iraq, its use among journalists and campaigners has 
become much more widespread because of it (Rentoul 2010). The Imperial War 
museum’s collection includes a poster produced in 2004 by the small left-wing British 
political party Respect that refers to Blair as ‘Bliar’ (Respect 2004). Journalists, political 
commentators and academics have sought to catalogue and document what they regard 
as the lies of Blair, Bush or both of them (e.g. Miller 2003; Scheer et al 2003; Kilfoyle 
2007; Hasan 2010; Mearsheimer 2011). Nevertheless, Blair himself is unequivocal: ‘I did 
not lie over Iraq’ (quoted in Sky News 2005). Others have listed what they categorize as 
exaggerations and misreporting, showing the gap between what Blair said and what was 
true, without making claims about intentionality (e.g. Rangwala and Plesch 2004). The 
allegation of lying was also used in the Conservative Party’s 2005 general election 
campaign in a billboard that said ‘If he’s prepared to lie to take us to war, he’s prepared 
to lie to win an election’ (quoted in Watt and White 2009). In January 2010, after Blair’s 
evidence to the latest official British investigation into the war – the Iraq Inquiry, also 
known as the Chilcot Inquiry after its chair, which started in 2009 and completed its 
public hearings in 2011 but which still has not reported - even more (80%) thought Blair 
had lied. Only 11% thought he went to war because he thought Iraq had WMD: the main 
reasons people agreed with the allegation of lying were that he wanted to impress 
George Bush and the US (40%) and because he thought it was right (36%) (Owen 2010).  
The allegations of lying relate to numerous elements of the period leading up to 
the war. This article considers two of the principal ones – 1) the Blair Government’s 
representation of the intelligence on Iraq as certain that Iraq had a substantial and 
growing WMD capability and 2) its claim that the UK was sincerely seeking a peaceful 
resolution through the UN whilst, in fact, regime change through war had already been 
decided upon. Our focus is mainly on the latter question, which has been less widely 
discussed  to  date  and  we  provide a brief  summation of the current state of 
knowledge regarding the first question as it was the substantive issue with which the UN 
route was ostensibly meant to deal.  Our objective with respect to the  UN route 
question is to compare public positions with important official documents now available, 
mainly due to leaks, and thereby identify key issues that the  forthcoming  Chilcot  
Inquiry Report needs to  deal  with  if  it  is to  properly  engage  with  the  issue  of  
deception  and  do  a  better job than  all  of the  official  reports  that have preceded it. 
To achieve its objective, this article proceeds  in  four  stages. First,  relevant  material  
from  official  inquiries   and  academic  research  is  reviewed  and  shown  to be lacking 
in conceptual development regarding deception and  grounding in the empirical evidence 
that has become  available  in  recent years. Second, we set out  a  conceptual  
framework we  devised   (Herring   and  Robinson  forthcoming)  in  order   to   distinguish  
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non-deceptive from deceptive ‘organized political persuasion’. Third, we provide a brief 
overview of the public position adopted by the Blair Government officials and Blair 
himself before the invasion and in their testimony to Chilcot regarding intelligence on 
Iraqi WMD and their approach to the UN route to dealing with the situation. Fourth, we 
apply our conceptual framework by way of a brief summary of the WMD intelligence 
issue, and then to a more detailed analysis comparing the testimony of officials to 
important contemporaneous documents regarding the UN route. In conclusion we 
summarize and reflect upon the grounds for our main arguments. On the WMD 
intelligence, it is now apparent that a campaign of deceptive organized political persuasion was 
conducted by UK officials. With respect to the UN route, there is mounting evidence that the 
Blair Government ran a campaign of deception on this issue as well in order to pave Britain’s road 
to war in Iraq. The conclusion also discusses briefly the need for further academic research into 
these issues and for proper engagement with them in the forthcoming Chilcot Report.  
 
OFFICIAL INQUIRIES AND THE ACADEMIC LITERATURE 
During the run up to the Iraq war the public position of the Blair government was that it 
was sure that Iraq had a substantial and growing WMD capability but that, if Iraq 
complied with the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions (SCRs), war would be averted 
and the regime would be allowed to remain in place. Although they made various limited 
criticisms of the Blair Government’s actions and processes, the UK official inquiries since 
– by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee (FASC 2003), the 
government-appointed Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC 2003), Hutton (2004) 
and Butler (2004) – have not disputed the essentials of these narratives.  
The academic literature has taken a wider range of positions but much analytical 
work remains to be done. Regarding intelligence and WMD, some of the literature shares 
the benign view of the official inquiries (Humphreys 2005) whilst others have focused on 
intelligence failures (Aldrich 2005) and psychological phenomena such as ‘group think’ in 
order to explain the public claims made regarding alleged Iraqi WMD (David and Perbo 
2004). In general, however, many scholars have criticized the way in which intelligence 
was manipulated and used by politicians (e.g. Kettel 2008, Mearsheimer 2011), but 
without providing sufficient detail to support their claims or a conceptual framework that 
is adequate to differentiate between different forms of deceptive communication. 
Regarding the UN route, the older literature has generally argued that it was intended to 
be  a  way of starting  the  war  rather  than  avoiding  it.  James  Wither  (2003-04) 
asserts  that the  UK  probably  had  signed up  to  war  while  professing to  be  seeking  
peaceful compliance through the UN; Christoph Bluth (2004: 879) concluded that the UN  
route was intended to trigger war; Mark Danner (2005) sets out some of the evidence 
that  the intention was war all along and that the UN route was a cover; and  Alan  Doig 
et  al  (2007) argue  that  the  UK  had  signed  up  for  war  and  deceived  the  public  
about  what  was  really going  on.  In  all  of these  cases,  a  conceptual  framework  
regarding  deception  is  not offered,  detailed  analysis  of this  specific  issue  is  not  
provided  and  they   did  not have access  to  the  many  documents  that  have  recently  
come  to  light  or to  Chilcot  testimony and  submissions. More  recently,  Kelly  McHugh  
(2013: 481)  concluded  that  Blair’s public position  that war could be  averted  through  
Iraqi   compliance   with   the   UN   is   belied  by  his  knowledge  that  the  United  States 
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was already committed to regime change. However, the evidence provided is relatively 
thin with few materials from Chilcot being used and with the argument being a small part 
of a broader analysis about the limits of UK influence on the US. Writing relatively 
recently, Jason Ralph (2011: 313-315) accepts the British government’s position. He 
argues that it was genuinely attempting to avert war in Iraq through persuading the US 
that, if Iraq complied with UN demands, the regime would have been successfully forced 
to change its character. However, nearly all of his evidence is from the retrospective 
testimony of Blair and David Manning (Blair’s chief foreign policy adviser) during the 
Chilcot hearings and a memoir written by Jonathan Powell (Blair’s Chief of Staff) and he 
pays minimal attention to the official documents now available. In contrast, this article 
compares the veracity of the claims of the Blair government with some of those documents.  
It is widely anticipated that when it is published the Chilcot Report will be highly 
critical of Blair’s decision-making processes (Owen 2013). However, whether it will 
include an explicit judgement on whether Blair and those close to him had deliberately 
deceived the public about the intelligence or their commitment to trying to achieve a 
peaceful resolution through the UN route remains to be seen. Publication of the Report 
has been stalled for two years over disagreement between Chilcot and the Cabinet Office 
regarding the disclosure of records of twenty five Notes and records of over 130 
discussions between Blair and Bush and also minutes of over 200 Cabinet and Cabinet 
Committee meetings. In January 2011, the Cabinet Office informed Chilcot that it would 
not allow even redacted versions of the Bush-Blair Notes and discussion records to be 
published. In May 2014, the Cabinet Office at last agreed to consider publishing the 
‘gists’ and quotes requested by Chilcot in July and August 2013. This was on the basis 
that Chilcot’s ‘use of this material should not reflect President Bush’s views’, as Chilcot 
put it, and that quotes should be used only to the extent necessary to substantiate the 
Report’s conclusions (Chilcot 2014). The phrase ‘not reflect President Bush’s views’ is odd 
and appears to mean that the gists and quotes had to not reveal anything about 
President Bush’s views that is not already known. The Cabinet Office had previously 
agreed that Chilcot could make public only a few extracts from Cabinet and Cabinet 
Committee minutes that he thought were the most important. The Cabinet Office claimed that it 
did not want to prejudice future relations with the US, though former Ministers routinely reveal 
such materials in their memoirs. Blair and key members of his government could have 
recommended that the Cabinet Office release more Cabinet level and Blair-Bush papers but have 
chosen not to do, which has generated suspicions about their motives (Mason 2014).  
The upshot of the limited release of documentation is that for the foreseeable 
future the public will only see what the Cabinet Office, the Chilcot panel and the Blair 
Government think they should see. So the question will remain as to whether those still 
secret materials would result in different conclusions being drawn about what happened. 
Is  there  a  smoking  gun  where  Blair  admits that  what  he   said  about  being  certain  
about  a growing  Iraqi  WMD  threat  was  untrue?  Or  where  he  admits  that  he  
wanted  to avoid a peaceful  resolution  through  the  UN  so  that  there  could  be  a  war 
for  regime  change?  We might  never  know,  or  not  know  for  decades,  unless the  
Chilcot  Report tells  us, there  is  a  leak  or  an investigative journalist like Chris  Ames  
(n.d.)   is   successful  with   a   Freedom  of Information   (FoI)  request.  Five   documents  
that  are  central to  the  argument  in  this article were  leaked  (Manning  2002;   Meyer  
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2002; Rycroft 2002; UK CO 2002; UK DOS 2002): whether they would have been 
declassified through Chilcot is unclear. 
Now that the Cabinet Office has responded to Chilcot’s requests for gists and 
quotes from the papers, the inquiry will still have to go through the process known as 
‘Maxwellization’, in which those who are criticized in the draft report are given an 
opportunity to respond before the Report is finalized and published, which could be a 
process lasting many months. In the meantime, the Chilcot panel has in its possession a 
large number of declassified documents which it could release but has chosen not to do 
so ahead of the publication of the final report (Ames 2014). The reasons given are that it 
is trying to ‘avoid misinterpretation and to ensure the fair treatment of individuals’ and 
that the report will provide necessary context (Iraq Inquiry FAQ n.d.; See also Chilcot 
2013). However, the Chilcot panel should not be and will not be the arbiters of interpretation, 
fairness or context, and efforts to understand the documents should continue. An important part 
of that understanding is to develop the necessary conceptual tools, including in relation to 
deceptive and non-deceptive organized political persuasion, a task to which we now turn.   
 
ORGANIZED POLITICAL PERSUASION: DECEPTIVE AND NON-DECEPTIVE 
Whilst there is a substantial literature on lying and deception, there is surprisingly little 
engagement with the topic from political scientists, and sustained engagement with 
deception in politics is rare (e.g. Arendt 1971; Mearsheimer 2011; Carson 2012). There 
are also extensive literatures on themes related to what we have labelled ‘organized 
political persuasion’ (Herring and Robinson forthcoming), such as propaganda, strategic 
political communication, perception management and public relations, but which do not 
theorize deception and lying in any depth, whatever their other strengths (e.g. Corner 
2007; Miller and Dinan 2008; Jowett and O’Donnell 2012). In view of these limitations, 
and in order to provide an adequate basis upon which to examine the issue of deception in 
politics, we developed a conceptual framework designed to distinguish between non-deceptive 
and deceptive organized political persuasion (Herring and Robinson forthcoming). We summarize 
the framework as follows. 
Organized political persuasion refers to a deliberate and systematic attempt to 
shape perceptions in order to gain support for a policy. This goes beyond simply trying to 
inform an audience, as the aim is to get the audience to adopt a particular perspective 
about the information being presented to them. Organized political persuasion can be 
conducted honestly and without involving an effort to deceive. In the case of the UN 
route, if the aim really was to go the extra mile for peace – to try to find a way to restrain 
Iraq’s WMD capabilities by getting it to comply with the relevant UN SCRs – then a 
campaign could have been run to convince the public non-deceptively that this that this 
was the right and prudent option to take. This would have been non-deceptive organized 
political persuasion, and this is what the Blair government and its officials claimed they did.  
In contrast, deceptive organized political persuasion is trying to convince an 
audience in ways that are misleading in order to get them to adopt a particular view of 
something. This can involve deception through lying (making a statement one knows or 
suspects to be untrue in order to mislead), deception through omission (withholding information 
to make the viewpoint being promoted more persuasive) and deception through 
distortion (framing a statement in a deliberately misleading way  to  support the viewpoint being  
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promoted) (Herring and Robinson forthcoming). Being caught out in a blatant lie – with 
direct evidence of saying something and admitting to knowing it to be straightforwardly 
untrue – is potentially politically fatal for a politician or official. It is something they 
usually manage to avoid by using tactics of omission, distortion and obfuscation.  
There is much to be said for using the still relevant and widely used term 
‘propaganda’ (Google Scholar shows over 3000 items with ‘propaganda’ in the title 
published since 2010), not least to challenge the frequently euphemistic use of terms 
such as ‘public affairs’ and ‘information management’. However, that that would require 
substantial work of clarification, as ‘propaganda’ is used in many ways, such as an 
inclusive, neutral term to cover all forms of organized political persuasion; a much 
narrower pejorative one to mean persuasion through deception for nefarious purposes; 
and an approach in which propaganda is communication aimed at one-sidedly benefiting 
the persuader (e.g. Jowett and O’Donnell 2012), to name just a few. Such a discussion 
goes beyond the scope of this article, which is concerned mainly with assessing the 
extent to which deception was used to pave Britain’s road to war in Iraq. The taxonomy 
set out above allows for a focus on the question of whether the intelligence and the UN 
route were represented publicly by the Blair government both at the time and 
subsequently in a deceptive or non-deceptive way, and, if the latter, whether that 
deception involved lying, omission, distortion or all three. This approach forms part of a 
wider framework which still allows for the analysis of misperception and self-deception 
as part of the overall picture. Indeed, those who focus exclusively on misperception and 
self-deception neglect the issue of intentional and collective deception by those in 
power.  
We now turn to providing an overview of the public position of the Blair 
government, articulated before the invasion and repeated in testimony to Chilcot, 
regarding the basis of their campaigns of organized political persuasion on WMD 
intelligence and the UN route.  
 
THE PUBLIC POSITION: TRYING TO DEAL WITH A PROVEN, GROWING IRAQI WMD 
THREAT PEACEFULLY THROUGH THE UN 
In their Chilcot testimony, key figures including Blair continued to assert the positions 
they articulated in public before the invasion: that, based on intelligence, they were 
confident that Iraq posed a serious and growing WMD threat, and that they were trying 
to defuse this threat peacefully through the UN. On the former point, when a member of 
the Chilcot panel asked Blair in 2010 ‘Was the intelligence telling you that the WMD 
threat from Iraq was growing?’, Blair responded ‘Yes [...] there were the September JIC 
[UK Joint Intelligence Committee] assessments that talked of continuing production of 
chemical weapons [... and] I was told and specifically briefed about these mobile 
production facilities for biological weapons’ (Blair 2010: 87-88. See also 91-92). On the 
latter point, Blair maintained that a peaceful resolution was always a possibility: 
We did have to persuade them [- the US - to go down the UN route], although I 
think it is fair to say that, even at that meeting, President Bush made it clear that America 
would have to adjust policy if Saddam let the inspectors back in and  the  inspectors  
were able  to  function  properly  [...]  at  several  occasions  over  the  next  few  months,  
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President Bush made it clear to me that, if the UN route worked, then it worked. 
We would have had to have taken yes for an answer (2010: 50-51. See also 59, 93, 
130, 157 and 167). 
Similarly, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, who served as the British Ambassador to the UN, stated 
the following with regard to UN SCR 1441 which declared Iraq to be in ‘material breach 
of previous relevant SCRS and which offered Iraq a ‘final opportunity to comply with its 
disarmament obligations’ (UN 2002): 
If Iraq recognised that the Security Council as a whole was setting out the 
alternatives in these terms, then it was more likely to complete its disarmament 
before the use of force was necessary. This concept - the setting of the terms in 
New York in such a way as to put maximum pressure on Saddam to concede 
without a fight - lay behind the UK approach all the way up to March 2003 
(Greenstock 2009: 9). 
On the one hand they may all have reported the truth. On the other hand they have had 
a powerful incentive to take this line: the alternative would be admit that they had lied 
about the UN route – that it was really a cover for a war and intended to build support 
and provide a legal justification for regime change. Christopher Meyer, British 
Ambassador to the United States, was an important exception to the public position in 
some respects, as we discuss later in this article. 
That the United States was intent on regime change, whether by supporting a 
coup, conducting air strikes, or using US ground troops in an invasion, is well known. US 
conservatives had been openly committed to toppling Saddam Hussein throughout the 
1990s. The Republican-controlled US Congress forced the official adoption of this 
position by Democratic President Bill Clinton. The 9/11 terrorist attacks were a crucial 
turning point. Those who were of the view that Saddam had to be removed by force if 
necessary to prevent even the slightest possibility that he might pass WMD to terrorists 
bent on attacking the United States came to the fore. They persuaded Clinton’s 
successor, George W. Bush, Jr. of the correctness of their position. Although the US 
invaded Afghanistan first, from late 2001 the US was concentrating on regime change in 
Iraq through invasion (Battle 2010; Prados and Ames 2010).  
In the next part of this article we draw upon the conceptual framework set out 
earlier in order to assess the issue of deception. The first section briefly focuses on the 
question of intelligence and WMD and provides an overview of the current state of 
knowledge on this issue. The second section focused on the less discussed and explored 
issue of deception and the UN route. Here we compare the public positions adopted by 
the Blair government during testimony to Chilcot with important official documents that 
have come to light on the relationship between the UN route and regime change. 
 
DECEPTION OVER INTELLIGENCE AND WMD 
As noted earlier, the bulk of debate regarding deception and the Iraq War has revolved around 
the question of whether the UK government lied with respect to the intelligence regarding Iraq’s 
alleged WMD. Much of it has focused on the UK’s controversial  September  2002  dossier.  
Whilst there is now a degree of consensus around the idea that the UK government  manipulated 
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intelligence in order to present Iraq as more threatening than it actually was, few 
accounts to date have reached satisfactory conclusions regarding the question of 
deception. In the years since the invasion of Iraq, however, sufficient evidence has now 
emerged which allows much firmer judgments on this matter (Herring and Robinson 
forthcoming). For example, documents released due to an FoI request revealed that the 
Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee John Scarlett, who had been tasked with 
coordinating the production of the September dossier, sent a minute containing the 
suggestion that other countries of concern should be excluded from the early drafts of 
the dossier because ‘[t]his would have the benefit of obscuring the fact that in terms of 
WMD, Iraq is not that exceptional’ (Scarlett 2002). This is a clear case of intention to 
deceive through omission. More generally, even the Butler Inquiry reached conclusions 
indicative of deception through both omission and distortion, noting that ‘warnings were 
lost about the limited intelligence base’ (Butler 2004: 454) upon which the dossier was 
based and that ‘judgements in the dossier went to (although not beyond) the outer limits 
of the intelligence available’ (Butler 2004: 82). Most importantly, senior officials including 
Blair involved in finalizing the dossier elected to use an unassessed piece of intelligence, 
received from a source on trial, and which was little or nothing more than a promise of 
evidence in the future of WMD production, in order to claim with certainty that Iraq was 
actively producing chemical and biological weapons and that these could be launched 
within 45 minutes of an order from Saddam (Herring and Robinson forthcoming). In 
doing so, officials distorted the available intelligence to make deceptive claims about the 
immediacy of the threat from Iraq. Overall, the case of the September dossier reflects a 
broader pattern of behaviour, in both the United Kingdom and the United States, 
whereby intelligence was manipulated through omissions and distortions so as to create 
the deceptive impression that policy-makers knew for sure that Iraq was a current WMD 
threat. In reality, the intelligence was limited and uncertain and, at best, suggested Iraq 
might become a credible WMD threat at some point in the future. This threat was what 
the UN route was supposedly to be aimed at dealing with peacefully. 
 
DECEPTION OVER THE UN ROUTE AND REGIME CHANGE: THE PUBLIC POSITION AND 
OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS COMPARED 
Nearly all of the documents drawn upon in this section of the paper emerged through leaks 
rather than declassification and all represent significant communications between the most 
senior officials involved in policy on Iraq. They represent the most informative documents drawn 
from a wider body of documentary evidence currently being researched by the authors. 
We compare the documents to the public position of the Blair Government in 
chronological order, an approach suited to understanding the unfolding dynamics.  
 
Iraq: Options Paper: ‘A legal justification for invasion would be needed [...] none 
currently exists [...] REGIME CHANGE has no basis in international law’ 
By  March  2002,   the   emphasis   in  British  policy options  preparation  was  on 
invasion  for  regime  change  framed  as  the  only  possible  route  to  dealing  with  Iraq.  
The  leaked  UK  Defence   and   Overseas   Secretariat’s   Iraq:   Options   Paper,   dated   8  
March   2002,  shows   that   military   action   to   remove   Saddam   from   power   had  
become   central    to   UK    thinking    on    Iraq    (UK DOS 2002).   It  starts by stating  
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that  UK  policy since 1991 ‘has been to re-integrate a law-abiding Iraq which does not 
possess WMD or threaten its neighbours’ but that this ‘implicitly [...] cannot occur with 
Saddam Hussein in power’ (UK DOS 2002: 1). The Options Paper concludes by stating that 
‘the use of overriding force in a ground campaign is the only option that we can be 
confident will remove Saddam and bring Iraq back into the international community’. 
Even though the paper shows that the United Kingdom was moving toward seeing 
forcible regime change as the only viable policy, it was not discussed in Cabinet and was 
not sent to all members of the Cabinet (Blair 2010: 22; Blair 2011: 10-13). This fact is 
indicative of deception through omission in that, at this stage of policy formulation, Blair 
kept some members of his Cabinet in the dark as to the direction of UK policy.  Indeed, it 
is deception through omission generally of the public and parliament. 
Richard Dearlove, head of the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6), had 
raised the issue of the legality of invading Iraq in his 3 December 2001 declassified letter 
to Manning: ‘Government law officers to provide assurances of legality [emphasis in 
original] (there has been a serious problem here)’ (Dearlove Private Secretary 2001: 4). 
Several paragraphs of the Options Paper are dedicated to this issue, including this one: 
 A legal justification for invasion would be needed. Subject to Law Officers advice, 
none currently exists. This makes moving quickly to invade legally very difficult. 
We should therefore consider a staged approach, establishing international 
support, building up pressure on Saddam, and developing military plans (UK DOS: 
1). 
The Options Paper did not say that the grounds for wanting to invade were legal and that 
this needed to be explained to the public. If they had, this would have been non-
deceptive organized political persuasion. If instead they thought that what they wanted 
to do was illegal and they had to find a legal ‘justification’ in the sense of a legally valid 
but false rationalization to hide their real goal, this would have been deception by lying. 
The Options Paper notes that ‘REGIME CHANGE [caps in original] has no basis in 
international law’, that there was no recent evidence of Iraqi involvement in terrorism, 
and that, at that time, action could only be justified if the UN Security Council found Iraq 
to be in breach of the Gulf War ceasefire SCR 687 (UK DOS 2002: 8-9). Regarding a 
ground campaign to remove Saddam it concludes: 
To launch such a campaign would require a staged approach: [...] A refusal to 
admit UN inspectors, or their admission and subsequent likely frustration, which 
resulted in an appropriate finding by the Security Council could provide the 
justification for military action. Saddam would try to prevent this, although he has 
miscalculated before (UK DOS 2002: 9). 
Hence the Options Paper presents a policy of regime change and then discusses the ways 
in which it can be achieved, in particular by gaining legal cover by going through the UN. 
There is no discussion of using the UN route in order to achieve Iraqi disarmament peacefully. It 
strongly indicates that a  policy  of  regime  change  emerged  first,  and  was  then  followed  by  
a  decision  to  go  through  the  UN  in  order  to  provide  legal  cover  and  also  build  public  and   
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international support. There was no deception about the legality of regime change. 
However, and at best, there was deception through omission in concealing the purpose 
of the UN route. 
 
Manning to Blair: ‘I said you would not budge in your support for regime change’ 
In preparation for Blair’s visit to Bush’s ranch in Crawford, Texas in April 2002, Manning 
sent Blair a memo on 14 March 2002 about a dinner he had with Bush, Condoleeza Rice 
(US National Security Advisor) and Meyer. This leaked memo reads: 
I said that you would not budge in your support for regime change but you had to 
manage a press, a Parliament and a public opinion that was very different from 
anything in the States. [...] The issue of the weapons inspectors must be handled 
in a way that would persuade European and wider opinion that the US was 
conscious of the international framework, and the insistence of many countries 
on the need for a legal base. Renwed [sic] refused [sic] by Saddam to accept 
unfettered inspections would be a powerful argument (Manning 2002). 
He could have said ‘you would not budge in your support for disarming Iraq, even if it 
took regime change to achieve it’. One reason he did not could have been that the 
primary objective was regime change, rather than disarming Iraq even if it left Saddam in 
power. Furthermore, this memo indicates that regime change had already been decided 
upon. Again, this is at the very least deception through omission in that the public, 
parliament and most of the Cabinet were not informed about the degree of UK 
commitment to supporting regime change. 
 
Meyer to Manning: ‘we backed regime change [...] I went through the need to 
wrongnfoot [sic] Saddam on the inspectors and the UN SCRs’ 
The priority being given to using the UN route to facilitate forcible regime change was 
understood by senior British officials, and underlined in interactions with the Bush 
administration. Meyer’s 18 March memo to Manning - also leaked - regarding a meeting 
he had the previous day with US Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz took the 
same line as that used by Manning: 
On Iraq I opened by sticking very closely to the script that you used the [sic] Condi 
Rice last week. We backed regime change, but the plan had to be clever and 
failure was not an option. It would be a tough sell for us domestically, and 
probably tougher elsewhere in Europe. The US could go it alone if it wanted to. 
But if it wanted to act with partners, there had to be a strategy for building 
support for military action against Saddam. I went through the need to 
wrongnfoot [sic] Saddam on the inspectors and the UN SCRs [...] (Meyer 2002: 
See also Meyer 2009: 47-48). 
A  sincere  commitment  to  using  the  UN  route  to  disarm  Iraq  peacefully  would  
have  involved  trying  to  get  Saddam  on   the   right   path,   not   trying   to   wrong-foot  
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him. If the sole purpose of the UN route was to trigger war then this was deception 
through lying. If an element of commitment was retained to working for and accepting 
peaceful disarmament leaving the regime in place, then the picture was more one of 
deception through distortion due to lack of admission of the mixed motives.  
 
Blair to Powell: ‘the immediate WMD problems don’t seem obviously worse than 3 
years ago’ 
During this period intelligence officials and policy makers discussed publishing WMD 
intelligence in order to mobilize public support for action against Iraq but they were 
concerned by the lack of a credible threat from Iraqi WMD (Herring and Robinson 
forthcoming). In a now declassified memo to Powell dated 17 March,  one of the reasons 
Blair gives for lack of support on the ‘centre-left’ for invading Iraq is that that ‘the 
immediate WMD problems don’t seem obviously worse than 3 years ago’ (Blair 2002a). 
He gave no hint of disagreeing with that assessment and, as demonstrated below, 
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw certainly did not and indicated this explicitly to Blair. 
Instead, Blair concludes that ‘we have to re-order our story and message’ and suggests 
that they ‘should be about the nature of the regime’. When asked about the immediate 
WMD problems not seeming worse and re-ordering the story at Chilcot, Blair said ‘it was 
the case following September 11th, it wasn’t that he was doing any more than he had 
been before. It was that our assessment of the risk of allowing him to do anything had 
changed’ (2011: 44-45. See also Blair 2010: 31-32).  Nevertheless, the public position of 
Blair and his Government was still one of portraying a growing threat in terms of Iraq’s 
WMD capabilities, as shown in the previous section on intelligence and WMD, rather 
than just a new unwillingness to tolerate possession of WMD by Saddam’s repressive 
regime or run a risk, however improbable, of him passing them on to terrorists. Blair had 
articulated this underlying concern publicly but did not say explain the extent of its role 
in driving policy, which suggests deception by omission and distortion.  
 
Straw to Blair: ‘we may want credibly to assert that regime change is an essential part 
[...] of the elimination of Iraq’s WMD capacity’ 
The problem with finding an alternative justification for war was that no potential legal 
grounds existed other than those pertaining to the UN SCRs related to Iraqi WMD. It was 
widely understood in the Blair Government that there were no legal grounds for armed 
action against Iraq either on the basis of humanitarian intervention or in terms of any 
terror threat (UK DOS). Accordingly, on 25 March, eight days after Blair’s memo to 
Powell, Straw spelled out to Blair in a declassified memo the importance of justifying the 
Iraq war through reference to international law and WMD, while accepting in a matter of 
fact way that that the WMD threat had not increased:  
If  11  September  had  not  happened,  it  is  doubtful  that  the  US  would  now 
be   considering   military   action   against   Iraq.  In  addition,  there   has  been  
no credible  evidence  to  link  Iraq   with   UBL   [Usama   bin   Laden]   and  Al  
Qaida.   Objectively,   the   threat   from   Iraq   has   not   worsened   as   a   result  
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of 11 September. What has now changed is the tolerance of the international 
community (especially that of the US)  (Straw 2002: 2). 
Straw notes the difficulty of justifying military action in terms of international law but 
then emphasizes that doing precisely that was essential: 
That Iraq is in flagrant breach of international legal obligations imposed on it by 
the UNSC provides us with the core of a strategy, and one which is based on 
international law. Indeed, if the argument is to be won, the whole case against 
Iraq and in favour (if necessary) of military action, needs to be narrated with 
reference to the international rule of law (2002: 2-3) 
Straw (2002: 2) then discusses the importance of the readmission of weapons inspectors 
with respect to both ‘public explanation’ and ‘in terms of legal sanction for any 
subsequent military action’. Referring to them as legal ‘elephant traps’, he sets out two 
points - that ‘regime change per se [emphasis in original] is no justification for military 
action’ and the question of whether another UN SCR would have to be passed before 
force could be used (2002: 2-3). Regarding regime change, he elaborates thus:   
Of course, we may want credibly to assert that regime change is an essential part 
of the strategy by which to achieve our ends – that of the elimination of Iraq’s 
WMD capacity: but the latter has to be the goal (2002: 2). 
He frames the argument for regime change as being indispensable to disarm Iraq of 
WMD not as the reality of the situation but something that the Government could 
choose to assert and could do so in a way that people are likely to believe. The framing 
seems to be one of legally convenient rationalization rather than genuine rationale – 
deception about motives rather than honest articulation of motives. The framing is not 
‘We must explain to the public our real position – we do not want them to 
misunderstand or to be misled by our opponents’ It can be seen from these quotes that 
the advice offered to Blair by Straw is presented in terms of employing the UN route as a 
way of justifying military action legally and not in terms of achieving the peaceful 
disarmament of Iraq. If so, Straw was advising Blair to deceive the public via omission 
and distortion.  
 
 Iraq: Conditions for Military Action: ‘an ultimatum could be cast in terms which 
Saddam would reject [...] and which would not be regarded as unreasonable by the 
international community’ 
One of the difficulties of knowing exactly what happened when Blair stayed at Bush’s 
Crawford ranch on 7-8 April 2002 is that they spent substantial amounts of time together 
without advisers or note-takers present (Meyer 2009: 28-29), although it is plausible that 
the US government secretly recorded everything. In a speech in Texas on 8 April at the 
George Bush, sr. Presidential Library, Blair (2002b) repeatedly linked  9/11, terrorism, 
regime change, WMD and Iraq: 
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 we must be prepared to act where terrorism or weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) threaten us [...] Not just by military means but by disrupting [...] the 
bankrollers of the trade in terror and WMD [...]  If necessary the action should be 
military and again, if necessary and justified, it should involve regime change 
[...W]here countries are engaged in the terror or WMD business, we should not 
shirk from confronting them. [,,, S]ponsoring terrorism or WMD is not acceptable. 
[... L]eaving Iraq to develop WMD [...] is not an option. The regime of Saddam is 
detestable [... T]o allow WMD to be developed by a state like Iraq without let or 
hindrance would be grossly to ignore the lessons of September 11 [...]. 
According to Meyer (2009: 29), this was the first time, to his recollection, that Blair had 
referred publicly to regime change. Many think that Blair gave a firm, personal assurance 
at Crawford to Bush about his support for regime change. This would have been in line 
with the internal British focus as of March 2002. As confirmed by Meyer at Chilcot (2009: 
37-48) in testimony that conflicts with the Blair government’s official position, the UN 
route was aimed not at avoiding war but making war for regime change possible with UN 
authorization and British participation:   
 the attitude of Downing Street was this: it was a fact that there was a thing such 
as the Iraq Liberation Act. It was a fact that 9/11 had happened and it was a 
complete waste of time, therefore, in those circumstances, if we were going to be 
able to work with the Americans, to come to them and say any longer – and bang 
away about regime change and say, “We can’t support it”, and the way I think the 
attempt was made to square the circle of supporting something to which the 
Foreign Office, and maybe other lawyers objected, was actually so to wrap it, so 
to contextualise it, that regime change, if and when it happened, would be with 
the benefit of the support of the international community in the framework of UN 
action (Meyer 2009: 41). 
The fact that the UN route was not about averting war but precipitating and enabling 
British involvement in it was underlined in a leaked Cabinet Office briefing paper dated 
12 June 2002 and titled Iraq: Conditions for Military Action (UK CO 2002):  
It is just possible that an ultimatum could be cast in terms which Saddam would 
reject (because he is unwilling to accept unfettered access) and which would not 
be regarded as unreasonable by the international community. However, failing 
that (or an Iraqi attack) we would be most unlikely to achieve a legal base for 
military action by January 2003. 
This framing is not what one would expect from a sincere effort at disarming Iraq 
peacefully through the UN. Such an effort would be focused on casting an ultimatum in 
terms which Saddam was most likely to accept, not in terms it was hoped he would reject 
and be seen to be unreasonable in doing so.  The proposal is clearly one of, at a 
minimum,  proposing deception through distortion and would be deception through 
lying if the aim was wholly to prevent a peaceful resolution while publicly claiming 
otherwise. 
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Rycroft to Manning: ‘Military action was now seen as inevitable [...] The NSC had no 
patience with the UN route’ 
US determination to go to war and its lack of interest in the UN route are reflected in the 
leaked ‘Downing Street memo’ from Matthew Rycroft, Blair’s Private Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs, to Manning. Dated 23 July 2002, this memo reported on the recent visit 
of Dearlove to Washington: 
There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as 
inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by 
the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being 
fixed around the policy. The NSC [US National Security Council] had no patience 
with the UN route [...]. 
The memo also reiterated Straw’s concerns over the need to strengthen the case, 
including the legal case, for attacking Iraq: 
It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action [...] But 
the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD 
capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a 
plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. 
This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force. 
The memo also refers to Blair’s views regarding finding a legal justification for war: ‘The 
Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam 
refused to allow in the UN inspectors’. A summary of Blair’s comments is posed entirely 
in terms of the UN route being used to facilitate military action: 
Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that 
was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya 
and Iraq. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. 
The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had 
the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work. 
The memo concludes with a number of references to the United Kingdom working up an 
ultimatum to Saddam, the need to pay attention to legal issues and an assumption that 
the United Kingdom would be involved in military action. As with all of the previous 
documentation analyzed above, the UN route is discussed entirely in terms of 
systematically and deceptively creating the political and legal support for attacking Iraq, 
as opposed to achieving disarmament through peaceful means. Hence there seems to be 
a consistent pattern of deception through omission and distortion.  
 
CONCLUSION: DECISION, DOCUMENTS AND DECEPTION  
The    public    position  of  the  Blair  government   at  the   time    and    subsequently    
has  been    that    they    were    trying    to   deal   with   a   proven   and   growing   Iraqi   
WMD   threat peacefully   through   the  UN  if  at   all  possible,  and  then  through  UN-
authorized  force  if necessary.  Awareness  that  the  US  was  intent  on    regime    
change  became    evident    in   November    2001.    That    UK  policy    was  hardening  in  
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March 2002 around a policy of supporting the US in regime change is indicated by the 
Options Paper and summaries of conversations between Manning and US officials and 
then Meyer and US officials. In the same month, Blair noted to Powell without demur 
that the centre-left view was that the WMD threat from Iraq had not increased. Indeed, a 
minute from Scarlett, who coordinated the production of the dossier on Iraqi WMD 
published in September, proposed de-emphasizing comparison with other states to 
obscure the fact that Iraq was not more of a threat than them. For his part, Blair 
emphasized to Powell the repressive nature of the regime and his attitude of decreased 
tolerance for such regimes in relation to WMD after 9/11. Only after this, late in the 
same month, does the issue of the UN route start to emerge with clear guidance from 
Straw to Blair that forcible regime change, illegal as a primary objective, had to be 
framed as necessary to achieve UN-mandated disarmament of Iraq. The Cabinet Office 
briefing paper in June 2002 articulated the hope that a disarmament ultimatum could be 
found that Saddam would reject and that the international community would perceive as 
a reasonable one so that an invasion could be launched. By July, the view of Rycroft and 
Dearlove was that a US invasion of Iraq was inevitable, with pursuit by the UK of the UN 
cover that would let the UK support the invasion, whether diplomatically or militarily, 
something the US would tolerate reluctantly. The finalization of the dossier in September 
involved strengthening the claims about intelligence-based certainty regarding Iraqi 
WMD capabilities, even though the basis of that claim was unassessed intelligence from 
an unproven source that was mainly or wholly a promise of intelligence in the future. 
Overall, there is compelling evidence that deception occurred over the intelligence, and 
the review of key documents here regarding the UN route provides a strong initial finding 
that officials were deceptive with respect to both their intentions regarding regime 
change and the possibility of averting war via the UN route. In his testimony to Chilcot 
(2010: 90), Blair said:  
 [...] this isn’t about a lie or a conspiracy or a deceit or a deception, it is a decision, 
and the decision I had to take was, given Saddam’s history, given his use of 
chemical weapons, give the over 1 million people whose deaths he had causes, 
[sic] given ten years of breaking UN Resolutions, could we take the risk of this 
man reconstituting his weapons programmes, or is that a risk that it would be 
irresponsible to take? 
The problem for Blair is that the case for war in Iraq was not made primarily on that 
basis, i.e. the regime’s past record and the future risk of reconstituted WMD 
programmes. He could not make the case on those grounds because such a war would 
not be legal and would not attract public or parliamentary support, and he knew it. This 
is why, as set out earlier, Blair and his officials made the public case for war in terms of 
being certain, based on intelligence, of a growing Iraqi WMD capability and in terms of a 
sincere attempt to use the UN route to disarm Iraq peacefully, even if it left the regime in 
place. As we have shown, however, the documents reviewed here do not support these 
public claims as representative of the internal deliberations of the Blair government. 
Instead, they indicate a war aimed at regime change, with the intelligence pointing to a 
very limited WMD capability and with the UN route being used to make that war more 
likely. In sum, the documents discussed in this paper provide strong indications that 
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Britain’s road to war was paved with deception. Important questions require further 
investigation. While it is clear that the peaceful UN route was not meant to work, was 
this primarily because they had already decided regime change was necessary to disarm 
Iraq? Or was it because they wanted to invade mainly for other reasons? The official line 
is that it was regime change to disarm Iraq. If the regime change was mainly for other 
purposes then this was another example of deception. Even if WMD disarmament was 
the primary motive, claiming publicly to be pursuing the UN route to peaceful 
disarmament while privately having no faith in it and indeed trying to make sure it did 
not work so that a war could be launched is still deception. Other issues for further 
research are how they went about making sure that the peaceful route did not work and 
comparing in much greater depth statements made to Chilcot and the documentary 
record. All of this needs to be brought together through identification of the omission, 
distortion and lying dimensions of the deception. It is vital that the Chilcot Report and 
further academic research establish the full extent, nature, purposes and limits of that 
deception.   
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